Abstract. Bayesian Networks (BNs) are an increasingly popular modelling technique in cyber security especially due to their capability to overcome data limitations. This is also exemplified by the growth of BN models development in cyber security. However, a comprehensive comparison and analysis of these models is missing. In this paper, we conduct a systematic review of the scientific literature and identify 17 standard BN models in cyber security. We analyse these models based on 8 different criteria and identify important patterns in the use of these models. A key outcome is that standard BNs are noticeably used for problems especially associated with malicious insiders. This study points out the core range of problems that were tackled using standard BN models in cyber security, and illuminates key research gaps.
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Introduction
The lack of data, especially historical data on cyber security breaches, incidents, and threats, hinders the development of realistic models in cyber security [?,?] . However, standard (or classical) Bayesian Networks (BNs) possess the potential to address this challenge. In particular, the capability to combine different sources of knowledge would help to overcome the scarcity of historical data in cyber security modeling.
Standard BNs belong to the family of probabilistic graphical models [?] . A standard BN consists of two components: qualitative, and quantitative [?] . The qualitative part is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) consisting of nodes and edges. Specifically, each node represents a random variable, whereas the edges between the nodes represent the conditional dependencies among the corresponding random variables. The quantitative part takes the form of conditional probabilities, which quantify the dependencies between connected nodes in the DAG by specifying a conditional probability distribution for each node. A toy example of a standard BN model, representing the probabilistic relationships between cyber-attacks ("Denial of Service Attack" and "Malware Attack") and symptoms ("Internet Connection" and "Pop-ups"), is shown in Figure 1 . Given symptom(s), the BN can be used to compute the posterior probabilities of various cyber-attacks as shown in Figure 1 . In this case, the user sets evidence for the "Pop-ups" node as "True", and "Internet Connection" node as "Normal" in the BN model based on his/her observations. Based on these evidences, the BN computes the posterior probabilities of the other nodes "Denial of Service Attack" and "Malware Attack" using Bayes rule. The BN model shown in Figure  1 determines that the presence of pop-ups and normal internet connection are more likely due to a Denial of Service attack rather than to a Malware attack. The major advantages of standard BNs include: the ability to combine different sources of knowledge, the capacity to handle small and incomplete datasets, and the availability of a broad range of validation approaches apart from data-driven validation approaches [?,?] . Some notable real-world applications of standard BNs include medical diagnosis [?] and fault diagnosis [?] . In addition, the advantages lead to the predominant use of standard BNs in domains where there is a limited availability of data, notably in Ecosystem Services (ESS) However, an overarching comparison and analysis of standard BN models in cyber security which could help to identify important usage patterns is currently lacking. Kordy et al. give a broader overview of modeling approaches based on DAGs, and thus only briefly mention BNs [?] . In contrast to Kordy et al., we specifically focus on BN models with the aim of performing comparison and analysis of these models to identify important usage patterns and key research gaps. This review would benefit the practical application of BN models in cyber security by providing important usage patterns and key research gaps. Therefore, this research aims to fill this gap by addressing the research question: "What are the important patterns in the use of standard Bayesian Network (BN) models in cyber security?". The research objectives are:
• RO 1. To identify standard BN models in cyber security literature.
• RO 2. To identify the important patterns in the use of standard BN models in cyber security based on the analysis of identified models.
In [?,?] are beyond the scope of this paper as they are incomparable especially based on their structure development. For instance, decision and utility nodes are specific to BDN/Influence Diagram which would allow decision making under uncertainty. In contrast, these types of nodes are not applicable to standard BN.
The scope of this comparison and analysis is the structured development, application and validation of the existing standard BN models in cyber security. The comparison and analysis of identified models is performed using the characteristics that were chosen based on related literature and domain-specific objectives as described in Section 2. The key contributions of this work are: important patterns in the use of standard BN models in cyber security, and key research gaps in the use of standard BN models in cyber security.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the review methodology. In Section 3, we perform the comparison and analysis of identified BN models using the characteristics that we chose, followed by a discussion on the key findings in Section 4. Finally, we highlight important patterns in the use of standard BN models in cyber security followed by future work directions in Section 5.
Review Methodology
We perform the systematic literature review based on the guidelines provided by Okoli et al. [?] . The methodology which we used to select the standard BN models in cyber security literature and the appropriate characteristics to perform the comparison and analysis of the selected BN models is described below.
The selection of standard BN models in cyber security literature consists of two stages:
• Searches were performed on ACM Digital Library, DBLP, Google Scholar, IEEE Xplore Digital Library, Scopus, and Web of Science -All Databases. Search-strings were constructed from keywords "Bayesian", "Bayesian Belief Network", "Bayesian Network", "BBN", "BN", "Cyber*", "Information*", and "Security". The wildcard "*" was used for "Cyber" and "Information" to match all words around these two keywords.
• Models were selected from the search results according to the listed criteria: -The model should employ standard BN.
-The model should address problem(s) associated with cyber (or information) security.
-The literature should have basic information about both DAGs and Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) . This criterion is important taking into account the scope of our comparison and analysis which is the structured development, application and validation of the existing standard BN models in cyber security.
-The literature should be in English language.
Once a standard BN model in cyber security was selected, the scientific literature that cited it was also traced.
The characteristics used to perform the analysis of the selected BN models were chosen based on related literature and domain-specific objectives as described in Section 2 and 3. Landuyt et al. presented 47 BN models in ESS published from 2000 to 2012 [?] . In addition, they analysed these models based on 9 characteristics. Similarly, Phan et al. presented 111 BN models in water resource management [?] . Moreover, they analysed these models based on 10 characteristics. We adopted the characteristics from Landuyt et al. and Phan et al. that are generic and relevant to the scope of our analysis, as shown in Table 1 . Also, we adapted and used the characteristic: Citation details provided by Phan et al. to perform the analysis of BN models in cyber security as described in Section 3. This section aims to address RO 1. To identify standard BN models in cyber security literature, and RO 2. To identify the important patterns in the use of standard BN models in cyber security based on the analysis of identified models. Based on the methodology described in Section 2, we identified 17 standard BN models in cyber security. The corresponding article titles are listed in Table 2 . Furthermore, this section performs the analysis of identified BN models based on the following characteristics.
• 
Data Sources Used to Construct DAGs and Populate CPTs
We used the characteristic "Data sources used to construct DAGs and populate CPTs" to identify the type of data sources utilised in the reviewed BN models. We employed the coding scheme provided by Phan et al. in Table 2 where "Expert Knowledge (K)" refers to domain expert(s) and/or article's author(s) knowledge, "Empirical Data (D)" refers to observational or experimental evidence or data, either available directly to the authors or derived from the literature [?] . From Table 2 , we observe that 5 out of 17 BN models used only expert knowledge to construct DAGs, whereas 5 out of 17 BN models employed only empirical data to construct DAGs. 7 out 17 BN models made use of both expert knowledge and empirical data to construct DAGs. In particular, 10 out of 12 BN models which utilised empirical data to construct DAGs relied on the literature. In contrast, 2 out of 12 BN models which utilised empirical data to construct DAGs relied on the inputs from vulnerability scanner [?] and incidents data [?] . From Table 2 , we infer that 11 out of 17 BN models utilised only expert knowledge to populate CPTs, whereas 3 out of 17 BN models used only empirical data to populate CPTs. On the other hand, there were 3 out of 17 BN models which employed both expert knowledge and empirical data to populate CPTs. Specifically, the sources of empirical data includes literature, incidents data, National Vulnerability Database (NVD), Open Source Vulnerability Database 
Type of Threat Actor
We used the characteristic "Type of threat actor" because this will allow us to understand whether the BN model in cyber security was developed with a focus on particular type of threat actor(s). We classified threat actors as insider versus outsider [?] . Furthermore, we also considered their intentions, which could be either malicious/deliberate or accidental [?] . Figure 2 shows the general distribution of the BN models reviewed according to the type of threat actors and their intent.
From Figure 2, . This model did not focus on any specific type of threat actor, but rather focused on alerts which could be appropriate to any type of threat actor. Therefore, we categorized it as 'non-specific'. 
Application and Application Sector
We used the characteristic "Application" to understand the type of applications that partially or completely benefit from these BN models. We used the Chief Information Security Officer mind map as the basis to classify the reviewed BN models based on their application [?] . In addition, we used the characteristic "Application Sector" to identify the type of application sectors in which these BN models were demonstrated. From Table 2 , we infer that 10 out of 17 BN models in cyber security completely or partially benefit Risk management. In addition, Forensic investigation, Governance, Threat hunting, and Vulnerability management were the other applications which completely or partially benefit from these BN models. From Table 2 , we observe that the application sectors were quite diverse. However, 15 out of 17 BN models focused on the cyber security of Information Technology (IT) environment. In contrast, 2 out of 17 BN models focused on the cyber security of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) environment [?,?].
Scope of Variables
We used the characteristic "Scope of Variables" to identify the entities to which the variables used in the reviewed BN models are related. In addition, we classify the variables used in the reviewed BN models based on the key elements of cyber security. Cyber security is a combination of three key elements: People, Process and Technology [?] .
From Table 3 , we observe that the variables used in the BN models that focus on the cyber security of ICS environment did not consider the 'people' element of cyber security [?,?] . Importantly, the variables used in these BN models are mainly related to the technological components of ICS ('Technology' focussed) [?,?] . In addition, we infer that the variables used in 2 out of 4 BN models employed for the problems associated with insiders consider the three key elements of cyber security [?,?] which are application-specific, whereas the variables used in 2 out of 4 BN models employed for the problems associated with insiders take into account only the 'people' element of cyber security [?,?] which might be applicable to different organizations. 
The Approach(es) Used to Validate Models
We used the characteristic "The approach(es) used to validate models" to identify the type of validation approaches used in the reviewed BN models. Based on our analysis, we observe that real-world case study [ 
Model Purpose and Type of Purpose
We used the characteristic "Model Purpose" to point out the problems that were tackled using BN models in cyber security. In addition, we used the characteristic "Type of Purpose" to identify the corresponding category of model purpose. Table  4 highlights the authors of the BN model, the corresponding purpose of the BN model, and the corresponding type based on the model purpose. I. To predict the probability of a data breach caused by a group of insiders who lose employee-and employerowned mobile devices or misuse the employer-owned mobile devices, II. To help health care organizations determine which additional measures they should take to protect themselves against data breaches caused by insiders.
Predictive, Diagnostic
Herland et al. [?,?] To assess information security risks related to smartphone use in Finland
To predict the probability of a data breach in a bank caused by a malicious insider
Predictive
From Table 4 , we observe that the reviewed BN models in cyber security were mainly used for two types of purposes based on their model purpose: I. Diagnostic: To reason from effects to causes, and II. Predictive: To reason from causes to effects. Importantly, 13 out of 17 BN models in cyber security were used for predictive purposes.
In the previous section, we identified key usage patterns of BNs in cyber security. This section discusses potential reasons for the key findings and suggests future research directions.
There is an emphasis on problems associated with insiders compared to outsiders in the use of standard BN models in cyber security. In general, this emphasis could be due to the most significant threat posed by insiders. This was elucidated by IBM's cyber security intelligence index which concluded that 60% of all attacks were carried out by insiders [?] . In connection with the use of standard BNs, the availability of characteristics associated with insiders in the literature provided a good starting point to determine appropriate variables and their relationships which form an integral part of a standard BN. In addition, the variables and their relationships determined from the literature were fine-tuned and/or complemented with other suitable variables based on expert knowledge in a few instances. This is one of the major advantages of standard BNs described in Section 1 which is the ability to combine different sources of knowledge. This could be the rationale behind the predominant use of standard BNs for problems associated with the insiders.
Special importance is given to problems associated with malicious insiders compared to accidental insiders in the use of standard BN models in cyber security. In general, this could be due to the fact that malicious insiders are more natural than accidental insiders in security contexts, as malicious insiders have a clear intent of compromising security, while accidental insiders do not. Moreover, malicious insiders have been shown to be the cause of more incidents than accidental insiders, as it was demonstrated by IBM's cyber security intelligence index which concluded that 44.5% of attacks were carried out by malicious insiders, and accidental insiders were responsible for 15.5% of attacks [?] . In order to use standard BNs for problems associated with accidental insiders compared to malicious insiders, it is important to identify features associated with accidental insiders in the literature to determine appropriate variables and their relationships, which form an essential part of a standard BN. There are studies which identify features associated with accidental insiders in the literature [?,?] . Once the appropriate variables and their relationships are determined for problems associated with accidental insiders, this could always be updated based on expert knowledge. It would also be useful to explore variables and their relationships in the reviewed BN models that focus on problems associated with malicious insiders, as some of the indicators might also apply for problems associated with accidental insiders [?] .
The focus on insiders may also explain why there is little research on applications in the ICS domain. The reviewed BN models that focus on problems associated with the insiders might not be suitable for ICS environments, especially for control rooms with an operator. This is prevalent in control rooms that are used to operate sluices in the Netherlands. Not accepting feedback, Anger management issues, Confrontational issues, Counterproductive behaviour towards individuals (CPB-I), Counterproductive behaviour towards the organization (CPB-O) were some of the variables used in the reviewed BN models [?,?] . Most of these variables might be measured/observed based on interactions of the particular individual with the co-workers. However, this would not be possible in the control rooms where there would be no co-worker. It would be interesting to explore in the future whether the variables and their relationships in the reviewed BN models focused on problems associated with the insiders are suitable for ICS environment, and also whether the size of the organization in which the BN model would be applied have an effect on these variables and their relationships. In general, the limited use of standard BN models in cyber security on problems associated with ICS environment could be due to the shortage of ICS security expertise [?] as majority of the reviewed BN models relied on expert knowledge especially to construct DAGs and populate CPTs.
There is no integrated BN model which takes into account the problem(s) associated with both insiders and outsiders, and their interactions. The German steel mill incident is a typical example of a cyber-attack which involves both accidental insiders and malicious outsiders, and their interactions [?] . As an initial step, the adversaries used both the targeted email and social engineering techniques to acquire credentials for the plant's office network. Later, once they acquired credentials for the plant's office network, they worked their way into the plant's control system network and caused damage to the blast furnace. Standard BNs would help to tackle problem(s) associated with both insiders and outsiders, and their interactions, for instance a standard BN model that could predict the probability of an individual being deceived by outsider(s) to cause a cyber-attack in an organization, given certain risk factors and symptoms. This BN model would especially help to identify vulnerable individuals in an organization against social engineering attacks, and effective measures which could reduce the likelihood of an individual deceived by outsiders to cause a cyber-attack in an organization.
It is evident that the initial attempts in the use of standard BN models in cyber security were using BAG-based standard BN models [?,?,?]. BAG-based standard BN model combines acyclic attack graph which acts as the DAG with computational procedures of BN. Attack graph is one of the extensively used approaches in security modeling which was introduced in 1998 [?,?] . The use of BAG-based standard BN models in the intial attempts could be due to practicality. It could be practical to build attack graphs first which had been extensively studied in this domain and use BN computational procedures for quantification during the early stages in the use of standard BN models in cyber security. Similarly, there were attempts in the safety domain which mapped fault tree to BN [?,?] . Importantly, BAG-based standard BN models model static systems. Therefore, they are not directly applicable to multi-step attacks.
Risk management, forensic investigation, governance, threat hunting, and vulnerability management were the applications of standard BNs in cyber security. However, it would also be useful to investigate the potential of standard BNs to benefit other applications. Chockalingam et al. highlighted the importance of integrating safety and security especially in the context of modern ICS [?] . BNs possess the potential to develop an integrated BN model that could diagnose the root cause of an abnormal behavior in the ICS especially whether the abnormal behavior is caused by an attack (security-related) or technical failure (safetyrelated) by taking into account certain risk factors and symptoms. This would allow the operator(s) to point out the best possible response strategy. For instance, the process of routing traffic through a scrubbing center would be a suitable response strategy for a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack whereas this may not be an appropriate response strategy for a sensor failure.
The sources of empirical data used to construct DAGs and populate CPTs include: literature, incidents data, NVD, OSVDB, and exploithub. It is important to identify other domain-specific empirical data sources which would help to develop realistic models in cyber security. For instance, Capture-The-Flag (CTF) events like SWaT security showdown (S3) [?] could be a potential data source to construct DAGs and populate CPTs. CTF events could generate datasets that are realistic in nature [?] . However, this could have been overlooked because the data generated in these events would be in most cases specific to that particular system, and the quality of data generated could depend on the participants.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have identified 17 standard BN models in cyber security. Based on the analysis, we identified important patterns in the use of standard BN models in cyber security.
• The standard BN models in cyber security were significantly used for problems associated with malicious insiders.
• There is an emphasis on the use of standard BN models in cyber security for problems associated with IT environment compared to ICS environment. In addition, the standard BN models that focus on the cyber security of ICS environment did not consider the 'people' element of cyber security. This implies that there is no standard BN model which deal with problem associated with insiders in ICS environment.
• There is a lack of standard BN models usage for problems associated with insiders and outsiders, and their interactions.
• Expert knowledge, and empirical data predominantly from literature were the data sources utilised to construct DAGs and populate CPTs.
• The standard BN models in cyber security completely or partially benefited risk management, forensic investigation, governance, threat hunting, and vulnerability management.
• The approaches used to validate standard BN models in cyber security were real-world case study, cross-validation, goodness of fit, monte-carlo simulation, expert evaluation, and sensitivity analysis.
These patterns in the use of standard BN models in cyber security would help to make full use of standard BNs in cyber security in the future especially by pointing out the current trends, limitations and future research gaps.
In the future, it is important to investigate whether the BN models used for problems associated with insiders are applicable for ICS environments, especially for a control room with an operator. It would be useful to demonstrate the capacity of standard BNs to tackle problems associated with both insiders and outsiders, and their interactions like social engineering attacks, collusion attacks. It would be intriguing to investigate how to deal with multi-step attacks using standard BNs. The potential of alternative data sources like model simulations, CTF events to construct DAGs and populate CPTs in cyber security also needs to be explored, as well as the capability of standard BNs to completely or partially benefit the other applications in cyber security.
